*Ce qu’il faut retenir:
Un Examinateur américain n’est pas tenu d’offrir au Demandeur une interprétation des revendications dans la formulation de leurs rejets.
***Pour les praticiens de la propriété intellectuel
Dans l’arrêt In re Jung, Jung a fait appel de la décision de l’Examinateur de rejeter les revendications au dossier, décision qui avait été affirmée par la BPAI, arguant que
“the examiner failed to make a prima facie case of anticipation, and the Board acted as a ‘super-examiner’ by performing independent fact-finding and applying an improperly deferential standard of review to the examiner’s rejections.” “…the articulation of a prima facie case should involve more than the notice of rejection outlined in § 132.”
La Federal Circuit a refuser de requérir aux Examinateurs à ce qu’ils articulent l’interprétation des revendications dans le cadre d’un rejet de celle-ci:
“There has never been a requirement for an examiner to make an on-the-record claim construction of every term in every rejected claim and to explain every possible difference between the prior art and the claimed invention in order to make out a prima facie rejection. This court declines to create such a burdensome and unnecessary requirement. “[Section 132] does not mandate that in order to establish prima facie anticipation, the PTO must explicitly preempt every possible response to a section 102 rejection. Section 132 merely ensures that an applicant at least be informed of the broad statutory basis for the rejection of his claims, so that he may determine what the issues are on which he can or should produce evidence.” Chester, 906 F.2d at 1578 (internal citation omitted). As discussed above, all that is required of the office to meet its prima facie burden of production is to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection and the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of § 132. As the statute itself instructs, the examiner must “notify the applicant,” “stating the reasons for such rejection,” “together with such information and references as may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing prosecution of his application.” 35 U.S.C. § 132. Here, the examiner’s discussion of the theory of invalidity (anticipation), the prior art basis for the rejection (Kalnitsky), and the identification of where each limitation of the rejected claims is shown in the prior art reference by specific column and line number was more than sufficient to meet this burden. “